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Abstract
 
This paper identifies and addresses some dilemmas to be faced in promoting educational
projects concerned with human rights. Part of the difficulty that human rights education
initiatives must cope with is the way in which value has been historically conferred upon
particular notions such as freedom and justice. I argue here that a just education must
grapple head-on with the conceptual dilemmas that have been inherited and refuse to shy
away from the implications of those dilemmas. To do this I address the fundamental fictions
upon which rights are based and view those fictions as nonetheless useful for opening up
the ethical terms of human rights education. With reference to the work of Arendt, Lyotard
and Levinas, I conclude that the real potential of human rights education lies in its capacity
to provoke insights that help youth live with ambiguity and dilemma, where freedom, justice,
and responsibility cannot be dictated to them, but rather involve tough decisions that must
be made in everyday life.
 
Keywords: Arendt, ethics, freedom, human rights, justice, Lyotard, Levinas,
responsibility, language game 
Hannah Arendt (1965a), in her essay, ‘The Crisis in Education’, points to the
power granted, however misguidedly, to education in political projects. She writes,
‘The role played by education in all political utopias from ancient times onward
shows how natural it seems to start a new world with those who are by birth and
nature new’ (p. 176).
 
1
 
 Indeed, this observation has become a sort of truism in how
we think about education with respect to human rights in particular, admitting, it
would seem, that the culture of rights needs education for its future security. The
idea is that through institutionalised practices of knowledge, children will come to
form habits of thought, attitude and spirit which are conducive to promoting and
creating landscapes of living with others that embrace a commitment to democratic
and rights-based principles. There is a large dose of commonsense—and indeed
consensus, at least in the West—in this hope we grant to education, and in this
trust we place in youth to be able to make a ‘new world’, better than the old one
we were born into. And not simply better, but more just. In the West, human rights
education initiatives have been developed in an attempt to ensure that youth can
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well take on the demands of democratic citizenship, both locally and globally. Such
initiatives would therefore appear to be excellent starting points for the pursuit of
justice, understood in terms of creating forms of living that serve to nourish the
very freedoms that allow dignity in human life.
Thus it is with some discomfort that I approach writing about the 
 
dilemmas
 
 of
human rights education, for it does indeed appear to be a luxury to write of
dilemmas in times of such global want. Nonetheless, I address in this paper the
fundamental fictions that rights are based on and how those fictions are useful for
opening up the ethical terms of human rights education. Part of the difficulty that
human rights education initiatives must cope with is the way in which value has
been historically conferred upon particular notions such as freedom and justice. A
just education, it seems to me, must grapple head-on with the conceptual dilemmas
that have been inherited, especially with respect to freedom, and refuse to shy away
from the implications of these dilemmas. If the UN Declaration is to be treated
with the respect it deserves, it must be engaged as a living document that has the
capacity under the weight of its own convictions to demand something more of us
than simply learning 
 
about
 
 it. Rather, the questions addressed in this paper are:
how might we bring into focus those underlying conceptions of freedom, justice
and responsibility in ways that enhance our living arrangements and that do not
leave us totally subject to an authoritarian reading of the declaration? How might
we think beyond an education that merely seeks to inculcate knowledge, toward a
 
just
 
 education that provokes insight into the conditions of freedom, justice and
responsibility themselves?
I have intimated above that education is perceived to be instrumental to the
purpose of human rights, yet the issue at stake is how might education contribute
something more than mere transmission in enhancing the cause of justice through
human rights? For it is difficult to escape the question of the difficulties of educa-
tion itself in this context. It is not that education has no role to play (in fact I think
it has a very important role) in familiarising students with basic rights, but even
the best intentions of teachers and technologies of education cannot guarantee the
expected outcomes, particularly one so grand as justice. Indeed I think it is wise
to heed the observations of Jean-François Lyotard (1998) who considers that the
very humanity of young persons reveals to adults (who are supposedly ‘in the
know’) precisely what we lack:
Shorn of speech, incapable of standing upright, hesitating over the
objects of its interest, not able to calculate its advantages, not sensitive to
common reason, the child is eminently human because its distress heralds
and promises things possible. Its initial delay in humanity, which makes it
the hostage of the adult community, is also what manifests to this
community the lack of humanity it is suffering from, and which calls on
it to be more human. (pp. 3–4)
Responding to this call to be more human means that both human rights and
education need to come together in ways that assume responsibility for children,
which cannot be done solely through the content of what we adults teach. Part of
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a rethinking of human rights education, in my view, needs to take into account that
the freedom, for instance, upon which it is based is not simply ‘content’, a concept
to be apprehended, used, and ultimately applied to daily life. It seems to me that
knowledge about rights is the bare minimum required and that the real potential
of education lies in its capacities to provoke insights that help youth live well with
ambiguity and dilemma, where freedom, justice, and responsibility cannot be
dictated 
 
to
 
 them, but involve tough decisions that must be made in everyday life.
 
Freedom in Rights: Fiction and Action
 
Article 1 in the UN Declaration states: ‘All human beings are born free and equal
in dignity and rights’. Add to this Rousseau’s (1762/1974) comment, that ‘man is
born free and everywhere is in chains’ and what floats inevitably to the surface is
the tension created when one mobilises the idea of ‘natural’ freedom to counteract
the actual bonds of servitude humans continue to endure around the world. Thus
freedom here is a fiction, a device we use to measure the very existence of people
in chains as unjust. It is an ideal, not a description, which has little basis in the
actuality of most people’s lives. But, as Agnes Heller (1992) writes, ‘statements
such as “all men are born free” need not be unmasked as fictions, because they are
meant to be fictions (or metaphors). Their ontological character is illusory. 
 
They
are ethical and political principles.
 
 they [sic] are 
 
not theoretical
 
, but rather pure prac-
tical principles’ (p. 351). Thus the question of what to do with the fiction, in
practice, is of utmost importance. For it is not to say that freedom has no meaning,
if rights, and the freedom that is asserted in them, ‘means to claim something that
is due, which is justice’ (ibid., p. 354).
Freedom here is needed for practical reasons, in order to take action, to leap into
lively human activity and to decide what is just. But it is a freedom not based on
the volition of an individual to direct itself to take action. Rather, as Arendt
(1965b) claims, freedom is something that can only be experienced in practice.
It is thus not an ‘absolute’ freedom, but is conditional upon a social reality. It is a
concept, though, that has been corrupted in modernity by its turn inward, as
though freedom were a phenomenon of the will, an expression of an inner life
(ibid., p. 151).
Arendt instead proposes a double movement: that freedom can only emerge
through political organization, and that freedom is the very reason why we have
need of politics in the first place (Arendt, 1965b, p. 146). ‘Without a politically
guaranteed public realm, freedom lacks the worldly space to make its appearance.
To be sure it may still dwell in men’s hearts as desire or will or hope or yearning;
but the human heart, as we all know, is a very dark place, and whatever goes on
in its obscurity can hardly be called a demonstrable fact’ (ibid., p. 149). For Arendt,
simply claiming that freedom belongs to the will puts us in a very precarious
position indeed. What she stresses instead is that freedom emerges out of the
communication we participate in with one another, as opposed to acting out of
wilfulness. She writes that ‘a state, moreover, in which there is no communication
between the citizens and where each man thinks only his own thoughts is by
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ay
no
oth
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
2:1
2 0
2 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
 Promoting a Just Education
 
595
 
© 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
 
definition a tyranny’ (ibid., p. 164). The capacity, then, for freedom to be realized
lies in a reorientation to freedom that demands constant political vigilance. It is
upon the scales of public life that freedom’s possibilities are weighed. Freedom as
a practice, then, must always live in the shadow of its opposite; the threat to
freedom comes not from a failure to exert one’s will, but from certain arrangements
of public life that threaten to dissolve its possibility.
As to the declaration that ‘all men are born free’, Arendt’s views underline the
nature of a necessary fiction, for if freedom is to mean anything at all it must
participate in a practical realm, where social and political organization allow not
for its expression, as if it existed prior to action, but for its inception. What Arendt
captures is the interdependent nature of freedom; a freedom built on intersubjec-
tivity, on communication, on public life.
Working within the dilemmas of freedom (as both fiction and practice) demands,
then, attending vigilantly to the possibilities that the fiction of freedom grants us.
With respect to education, it seems especially pertinent, then, to read the con-
nection between freedom and rights less in terms of having a definitive content,
and more in terms of how freedom 
 
performs
 
 in acting with others. Freedom is not
about telling others how they should live, but engaging in a communicative process
that focuses attention on the many faces of freedom within rights-based societies.
Thus when Heller (1992) suggests, ‘rights are the institutionalized forms of the
concretization of universal values (both the value of freedom and of life)’ (p. 93)
she seems to sidestep the question as to how rights themselves and the freedom
they represent are possibly contestable in the actual concrete communicative practices
in which humans engage. While the fiction of freedom in the statement ‘all human
beings are born free’ allows us to entertain, and helps to regulate, justice, the idea
that all have a right to life as well as liberty leads to the very difficult work of
building a new public realm while simultaneously aiming to secure individual
needs. The question for human rights education is how might it exist in the space
between creating environments of succour and nourishment of human life while
creating possibilities for the active, practical condition of freedom.
 
Just Responsibility
 
In wanting to extend the importance Arendt places on the public, communicative
quality of freedom, I also want to introduce here, through the work of Lyotard and
Levinas, the idea that justice and responsibility are based neither on criteria nor
content, and that this shifts our model of human rights education from one that is
deducible from principles to one that emphasizes communicative practice. In my
reading below, I draw out how this latter model is linked to a particular ethical
conception of rights.
Seeing modernity as that which ‘comprises in itself an impulsion to exceed itself
into a state other than itself ’ (Lyotard, 1998, p. 25), Lyotard worries that pluralities
that mark life in modernity impel us to reflect upon the universality of principles,
like freedom and justice, which frequently have been used as means of oppression.
Lyotard discusses justice through an analysis of language games and the ways
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certain statements perform certain functions. As we have already seen, the state-
ment that ‘humans are born free’ is not a descriptive statement, even though it is
stated as fact. Instead, it poses as a descriptive phrase that implores one to act 
 
as
though
 
 each human being were indeed free. Conceived as a fiction for Heller,
Lyotard posits freedom as the Idea that regulates justice (Lyotard & Thébaud,
1985, p. 84). Relying heavily on Kant, he proposes that freedom is not determi-
nate; that is, it does not establish the content of laws, nor can it determine its own
content (ibid.). ‘Freedom is regulatory; it appears in the statement of the law only
as that which must be respected; but one must always reflect in order to know if
in repaying a loan or in refusing to give away a friend, etc., one is actually acting,
 
in every single instance
 
, in such a way as to maintain the Idea of a society of free
beings’ (ibid., pp. 84–5). Under this view, freedom cannot tell us how to judge,
how to decide; it cannot be concretised, for it is an Idea that one uses reflectively,
as opposed to obeying it as though it held the answers for combating injustice.
Now this carries significant meaning for justice. Freedom (even in the guise of a
descriptive statement) cannot determine for us how we are to judge, or why we
ought to judge. Descriptive statements cannot logically give rise to prescriptive
ones (ibid., pp. 21–22). Thus, the statement that there is massive suffering in the
world, while speaking a truth, does not 
 
logically
 
 lead to the statement that I ought
to do something about it, which speaks a command to be just. ‘In other words, in
so far as justice is prescriptive it cannot be derived from theorizing “the true”’
(Smart, 1998, p. 52). There is no justification possible for being just, or for the
command to be just; ‘it is proper to prescription to be left hanging in midair’
(Lyotard and Thébaud, 1985, p. 45). A prescriptive phrase does not denote or
describe the human condition as it actually is, nor does it derive its ethical force
from a factual depiction of the world. As prescription, it exists beyond the bound-
aries of what we can see, what we can know, what we can report. But it is far from
‘empty’. For Lyotard, a judge decides, case-by-case, without definitive criteria.
Justice comes about through the exercise of prudence, not the application of rigid
criteria (ibid., 26). It is an idea of justice that guides the judge in her decision, and
moreover, this idea is in turn regulated by, if you will, an imaginative faculty that
seeks to bring the law in line with the individual circumstances of each case. In
short, similar to Arendt in this respect (and perhaps in this respect alone),
Lyotard asserts that judgement occurs in action.
The language game, then, of justice is one of prescription, and has no basis in
fact or truth. Justice problematically rests within a language game that can have no
grounding on the concrete content of freedom. Rather, it is situated within a set
of, what Lyotard refers to as, ‘pragmatics’; there are certain pragmatic rules that
define each language game, and each of us participates in several (ibid., p. 93). The
pragmatic of justice lies, for him, in the obligation we have to others to decide and
to make that decision among competing language games. Most importantly, this
pragmatics forces us to continually hold open the question of justice itself, where
we can return to it again and again. That is, each time I come into contact with a
situation, where individuals speak to me, they not only speak to me through dif-
ferent language games, but also command from me an obligation by virtue of the
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fact that they address me. They require a response. And that response can only live
up to its name of response when I refuse to impose upon them a set of criteria or
to hear their words only through a filter of laws, regulations, and such. Instead, the
response that is commanded is a listening to the other knowing that my judgement
must come through a reflexivity in which I continually ask myself—is this a just
decision? This is the language game of justice. And although we can never know
with complete certainty whether we have been just, Lyotard states that:
Absolute injustice would occur if the pragmatics of obligation, that is, the
possibility of continuing to play the game of the just, were excluded. That
is what is unjust. Not the opposite of the just, but that which prohibits
that the question of the just and the unjust be, and remain, raised. Thus,
obviously, all terror, annihilation, massacre, etc. or their threat, are, by
definition, unjust. (ibid., pp. 66–7)
We can see that Lyotard is concerned to get away from the relativism that appears
to be implied in any language game. But what is to be underscored here is that it
is not ‘anything goes’, but that justice is held together both through obligation to
the other and the Kantian idea of a society of reasonable, free beings. This latter
idea, he is emphatic to point out, does not in any way determine our action.
Indeed, if it were to do so, it would constitute a terror (ibid., p. 92), and make it
impossible to keep open the question of justice. Instead, the idea guides our
decisions in the context of the obligation that itself knows no language game, that
rises up in our encounter with difference.
Obligation to others, in conjunction with the regulatory ideas of freedom and
justice, inform the pragmatics of justice. As a practice, justice then does not rest
on how well laws, or rights, are articulated, but on how individuals are responded
to, which requires not treating those laws as though the contents of them were
transparent.
 
2
 
 Thus in seeking to promote the right to freedom among women in
Afghanistan or Guatemala or Ireland or France, such a right cannot be judged in
the abstract—as if justice had little to do with the differences that matter to
these women’s life situations; it is not that there is a plurality of justices, but that
there is a justice of plurality.
 
3
 
 It is only sensitivity and flexibility that keeps the
self-questioning—am I being just?—at the forefront of one’s decision. Justice, then,
is to be seen ‘against the horizon of a multiplicity or diversity’ (ibid., p. 87).
Interestingly, Lyotard attributes this refusal to see judgement simply through the
means of obeying predefined prescriptives to the teachings of Judaism. ‘The refine-
ment that Judaism brings to the notion of obligation is precisely that one has to
watch out for prescriptions that appear to be just or authorized; they are not always
to be taken literally, and they may result in the most extreme injustice. They must
always be taken as much as traps as obligatory prescriptions. And thus they always
refer one back to responsibility, to the responsibility of listening, of lending oneself
to obligation’ (ibid., p. 66).
In this way, then, justice carries within its practice notions of responsibility and
obligation. Levinas, upon whom Lyotard also draws, proposes that this obligation,
which amounts to a command from the other, cannot be justified. Rather I am
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ay
no
oth
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
2:1
2 0
2 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
 598
 
Sharon Todd
 
© 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
 
subject to the other as soon as she addresses me for no 
 
logical
 
 reason; I am
commanded by her to respond 
 
beyond
 
 all reason. Thus, my commitment to her does
not arise from the freedom of my will—i.e., that I choose to be responsible; it
is instead a ‘
 
responsibility that is justified by no prior commitment
 
’ (Levinas, 1998a,
p. 102). This non-justifiable responsibility is something that grips me unawares;
just by encountering another’s face an obligation to that other wells up in me.
‘There is a paradox in responsibility, in that I am obliged without this obligation
having begun in me, as though an order slipped into my consciousness like a thief,
smuggled itself in ...’ (ibid., p. 13). This paradox is precisely what underlies our
commitments to justice—and to rights. My capacity to decide, to make decisions
that keep open the question of justice, is, therefore, not a result of exercising my
freedom. Quite the contrary. They lie instead in my capacity to be the receptacle
for smuggled goods. ‘The responsibility for the other can not have begun in my
commitment, in my decision. The unlimited responsibility in which I find myself
comes from the hither side of my freedom, from a “prior to every memory”, an
“ulterior to every accomplishment”, from the non-present par excellence, the non-
original, the anarchical, prior to or beyond essence’ (ibid., p. 10). As that which
cannot be concretised (that is, that freedom exists in a particular condition), free-
dom can only be experienced as I exceed myself, take the other’s command into
me, and thereby enable the freedom of the other to emerge.
In terms of justice, I decide, evaluate, compare, and prioritise on the basis of my
obligations to others, not upon the basis of pre-defined principles, laws, or rights.
And, of course, the practice of justice then requires that I live in concert with those
others. ‘The one respected is not the one to whom, but the one with whom one
renders justice. Respect is a relationship between equals. Justice presupposes this
original equality’ (Levinas, 1998b, pp. 43–44). Naturally, justice requires some-
thing more than simply my own judgement. And Levinas is adamant, of course, as
a Jewish philosopher writing in the wake of the Holocaust, that we are able to judge
that which is unjust; but nowhere does he describe the content of what that justice
looks like. Thus, to judge totalitarian states, such as Nazi Germany, rests precisely
on what Lyotard refers to as subjecting ourselves to a prescriptive. We exercise
rational thought only after the command from the other has been heeded, and that
command rests on our capacity to be moved by others’ suffering, to allow it to
enter us as difference. Thus it is not suffering in and of itself that gives us the
reason to act, but our sensitivity to the plight of others initiates a command to
respond responsibly.
Recognizing that justice simply does not lie within the judgements you and I
make, but within forms of sociality that bring to mind Arendt’s public sphere,
Levinas reveals a necessary paradox: that the state is necessary for justice at the
same time that it cannot enact a responsibility for each individual in its care.
‘But it is very important, in my view, that justice should flow from, issue from, the
pre-eminence of the other. The institutions that justice requires must be subject to
the oversight of the charity from which justice issued. Justice, inseparable from
institutions, and hence from politics, risks preventing the face of the other man
from being recognized’ (Levinas, 1999a, p. 176). In this sense, laws, rights, or
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institutions such as education, must continually keep vigilance over the inevitable
and necessary failure of justice to be realised. Embedded within this is a plea for
laws to change constantly in order to improve upon the possibilities for justice, or
as we might say along with Lyotard, upon the pragmatics of the justice language
game.
What I have discussed thus far has enormous bearing upon how rights might be
rethought. In an essay entitled ‘The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other’,
Levinas proposes that rights begin with the Other, rather than with freedom
(Levinas, 1987, p. 124). Justice can indeed come to the defence of rights, but if,
and only if, it is not based on a notion of an autonomous freedom, or free will. He
writes, ‘in defending the rights of man, the latter should no longer be considered
exclusively from the point of view of a conception of freedom that would already
be the potential negation of every other freedom and in which, among freedoms,
the just arrangement could only come from reciprocal limitation’ (ibid., p. 123). A
just arrangement in defence of rights suggests itself when freedom becomes linked
to responsibility. ‘One’s duty regarding the other who makes appeal to one’s
responsibility is an investing of one’s own freedom. ... My freedom and my rights,
before manifesting themselves in my opposition to the freedom and rights of the
other person, will manifest themselves precisely in the form of responsibility, in
human fraternity’ (ibid., p. 125). In another essay on the same topic, Levinas writes
that while the universal character of freedom needs to be granted in defending
rights, he also concedes that even this ‘free limitation of its freedom ... in consent-
ing to the rationality of the universal [i.e., that all humans are free]’ does not
guarantee that any good will result (Levinas, 1999b, p. 148). ‘Unless a pre-eminent
excellence were granted to the other 
 
out of goodness
 
: unless 
 
good will were will
 
, not
just out of respect for the universality of a maxim of action, but out of the feeling
of goodness. A simple feeling that we speak to children about, but that can have
less innocent names, such as mercy or charity or love. An attachment to the other
in his alterity to the point of granting him a priority over oneself ’ (ibid., p. 149).
The turn that Levinas makes is to view human rights as an ethical project, not
a project of rationality or knowledge alone. Like Lyotard, such a project cannot
be grounded in rational arguments; it is rather a practise constructed around a
recognition both of the idea of freedom and that of justice, based on a command to
respond to the other. This command, moreover, is something prescribed to me before
any freedom. Freedom, then, is not the ground of rights; rather responsibility is.
 
Human Rights Education: Toward Responsibility and Justice?
 
Documents and policies dealing with human rights education place great emphasis
on how best to instil and inculcate among children the values inherent in the UN
Declaration as well as various Human Rights Codes.
 
4
 
 The calls for education to
transmit the contents of the Declaration and to help students engage in an under-
standing of human rights that are found within the UN documents themselves,
smoothes over the very dilemmas that students face in coming to grips with how
abstract and apparently universal principles speak to the particularities of their own
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life situations. And this is especially true when those students come from societies,
cultures, and languages, where freedom and individuality signify something quite
different than they suggest in the schools in which they are being educated. More-
over, there is no single content that one can give to freedom across languages. For
instance, the French term ‘
 
liberté
 
’ and the English ‘freedom’ do not encompass the
same nuances of meaning.
 
5
 
 Furthermore, calls for individual freedom cannot be
easily imported into cultures with a deep sense of duty to community.
 
6
 
 Moreover,
if pursuing justice, which is the stated aim of the development of the UN Declara-
tion in the first place, cannot be secured through recourse to knowledge alone,
then it would seem that the goal of disseminating knowledge as fixed and trans-
portable to practise is simply not adequate. What I am offering here, by way of
conclusion, are points that suggest possibilities for rethinking education’s role in
the project of human rights by working with, as opposed to smoothing over, the
dilemmas of freedom and justice.
First, following the above thinkers, but particularly Arendt, education can be
deeply involved in constructing public spaces for students to experience human
rights. With respect to the right to education (Article 26 of the UN Declaration),
UN Special Rapporteur Katarina Toma
 
s
 
evski (2001) proposes that all aspects of
education integrate human rights, as opposed to treating human rights as a
separate topic in social studies. In particular, she is concerned with focusing on the
process of education itself. With respect to process, I earlier raised a question: how
might education participate in creating spaces that nourish human life as it creates
possibilities for the active, practical condition of freedom? If public life is to be
invigorated, then how might any systemic practice, including education, attend to
the needs of individuals? There are no clear, prescriptive answers to these ques-
tions. Listing a series of tasks that would bring about such attentiveness would
work precisely against the judgement that teachers and students themselves need
to exercise in making decisions about their school communities. Yet, it is not
enough to say nothing. Understanding first of all that pedagogies, even when
promoting conditions for social justice, cannot rely on curriculum alone to create
an atmosphere of equality and respect is a step in the right direction. The authority
granted to teachers suggests that they need to create conditions where students
begin to exercise their faculties of communication in order to produce lively social
and intellectual communities. Differential treatment of individuals can indeed be
an important place to begin, but seen in the service of enabling students to live
also with the difficulties of pluralism; to have opportunities to listen to one another
and to speak with responsibility is certainly something that any human rights
education can be concerned with, not just in terms of the classroom, but in terms
of community organizations with which schools are connected.
Secondly, the difficulties posed by freedom and justice (both of which remain on
a horizon of possibility, as opposed to something one achieves through certain
behaviour), demands a rethinking of education’s role in promoting human rights.
Even in familiarising students with the actual articles of the Declaration, or using
case studies to encourage them to apply certain rights and codes in order to make
judgements, the tasks are set up too often to reflect the ease with which judgement
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can be made. It seems to me we do a disservice to children to present judgement
in this light. Although we are not educating children to be Human Rights Com-
mission judges, we are educating them to participate in society (of which school is
undoubtedly a part) reflectively and critically. How students make meaning of
human rights, how they fathom freedom and justice, and how they perceive their
own rights in relation to others can be given expression through engaging with the
dilemmas of rights and judgements as opposed to pretending they do not exist. To
have students be creative with language (or perhaps even a language game) that
allows them some space for indeterminacy, allows them to ask questions and pon-
der the very dilemmas that rights present to individuals and states, and does not
denigrate the project of human rights. I think some human rights educators are
afraid that once uncertainty is allowed in, rights will be thrown out the window
and an anything-goes attitude will run rampant. Although I acknowledge this as a
real concern, I do think that discussions with youth on how critique might be
constructed on the basis of an affirmation of rights can be crucial. Further, the
educational documentation that exists often proposes teaching about rights through
violations, with no adequate language for teachers (and students themselves) to
think about the strong expressions of guilt, powerlessness, and apathy that often
accompany the reception of these stories. Thus, an important task for human rights
education is to begin to construct a language that allows youth to question their
responses in ways that make obvious their own implication in the lives of others.
Finally, a note on responsibility. If freedom is found in responsibility, one might
be tempted to state that the role of education in human rights initiatives is to
educate responsibility in students. But my discussion of Levinas suggests that the
obligation we have toward others is not something one learns as a piece of know-
ledge. Responsibility is a response to the command of the other; it is a prescriptive
to a prescriptive. In no way can responsibility be instilled or inculcated in a direct
fashion and thus it cannot be systemised into any curricula or teacher manual. But
this is not to say that it has no bearing upon education. In fact, viewing rights in
terms of responsibility rather than entitlement (the latter making up much of the
educational literature), suggests a reorientation to the actual teaching of human
rights. Moving away from didactic materials that seek only to ensure students have
learned what their rights are, a renewed education would need to discover ways of
creating a pedagogy of implication. That is, a pedagogy whereby we are continually
vigilant in attending to the needs of others in a way that takes responsibility for
our own responses. Such vigilance does not come easily, but if human rights
education is to have any hope of creating a just education, paying attention to how
we judge and why we judge seems to demand just such measures.
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Notes
 
1. Arendt is, of course, critical of this view; but it is the seeming naturalness of the link
between education and political projects that continue to be operative, in my mind, to
human rights education initiatives.
2. Lyotard is emphatic that ‘any attempt to state the law, for example, to place oneself in
the position of the enunciator of the universal prescription is obviously infatuation itself
and absolute injustice, in point of fact’ (Lyotard & Thébaud, 1985, p. 99). The problem
with Human Rights declarations is that of course they have attempted to state the law,
and thus to a large degree Lyotard sees them as closing off possibilities for justice. See
also his comments in Lyotard (1988, section 44, p. 31; 1998, pp. 5–6).
3. Lyotard asks: ‘Can there be a plurality of justices? Or is the idea of justice the idea of
a plurality? That is not the same question. I truly believe that the question we face now
is that of a plurality, the idea of a justice that would at the same time be that of a
plurality, and it would be a plurality of language games’ (Lyotard and Thébaud, 1985,
p. 95).
4. As stated above, this theoretical paper has grown out of a study conducted on Human
Rights Education literature and documentation, particularly that found in Canada and
Sweden.
5. One can also see even greater difficulties when looking at translations. For instance, the
beginning of Article 4 of the Rights of Man reads: ‘La liberté consiste à pouvoir faire tout
ce que ne nuit pas à autrui …’. In English, 
 
liberté
 
 is, as usual, translated as liberty, while
 
pouvoir faire
 
, which means, literally, power to make, is translated as freedom.
6. See, in particular, Wang (2002) and Pollis & Schwab (1979).
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